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1. Introduction 
Recent concern over Federal budget deficits has led to many public policy 
proposals. Proposals range from short-term combinations of tax-expen- 
diture changes to long-term changes like a balanced budget amendment and 
line-item veto provisions for the President. Since much of the debate focuses 
on alleged symptoms of unacceptably large deficits (high interest rates, high 
values of the dollar and unfavorable trade balances), these proposals may 
offer solutions that are temporary and, at best, offer only obscure routes 
to eliminating the underlying sources of deficit growth. At worst, such 
proposals may contribute to larger future deficits if they foster the underly- 
ing factors causing deficit growth. 
Following work on the Federal sector in Manage and Marlow (1986), we 
examine the causal relation between expenditures andtax revenues at the 
state and local levels of government. Manage and Marlow (1986) provides 
some evidence that Federal spending is determined by tax revenue. This 
paper addresses the issue of whether or not the many different fiscal con- 
straints that exist at the state and local level affect the causal relations be- 
tween tax receipts and expenditures of those governments. Motivation for 
our study stems from the frequently-made observation that, unlike their 
Federal counterpart, he finances of state and local governments are rela- 
tively well-behaved. Examination of causality may suggest how constitu- 
tional and legislative constraints have affected the finances of state and local 
governments. In terms of policy implications, this examination may yield 
information on the appropriatability of extending currently-existing con- 
straints at the state and local levels to the Federal evel of government. 
*The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
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2. Tax revenue-expenditure relations 1 
Public finances are determined by political choices subject to various 
constraints. The budget constraint facing governmental units consists of 
direct and indirect ax receipts and debt; spending must always be balanced 
by some combination of these funding sources. Direct tax receipts are legis- 
lated while indirect receipts are the product of inflation. Inflationary poli- 
cies raise revenues by raising effective tax rates, allowing future debt 
payments to be repayed with deflated currency and by directly exchanging 
Treasury debt with cash or credits on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. 
Whenever the sum of direct and indirect ax receipts is less than expendi- 
tures, the deficit must be financed by debt. 
The question of how to test the revenue-expenditure relation is basically 
a question of causality. One-way causality implies that one variable deter- 
mines the other. Two-way causality implies that both variables are simul- 
taneously determined. A straightforward approach to assigning causality 
stems from the notion that funding constraints determine the spending 
opportunity sets of goverments; that is, spending levels are ultimately deter- 
mined by budget (resource) levels. In the case of private citizens, the limits 
of current consumption are determined by accumulated wealth, current 
income and ability to borrow on projected future resources. In addition to 
the power to create money, a goverment's ability to consume must also be 
constrained by the same factors that confront private citizens. 
The argument for causality in the other direction appears less compelling. 
For tax revenues to be determined by spending levels, the constraint would 
be spending levels and the choice variable that reacts to that constraint 
would be the funding level. Since the spending 'desires' of private citizens 
are boundless, we expect he same to hold in the case of government units. 
That is, since the study of economics argues that consumers are unable to 
satisfy their unlimited (spending) 'wants', how could government units 
succeed to fund the unlimited 'desires' of the populace? Because 'desires' 
are boundless, we must also argue that budgets are as well in the case of 
spending choices determining (causing) the funding level. This does not 
appear to be a useful approach. Moreover, within some feasible resource 
constraint, government expenditure growth probably requires growing 
direct ax levels since it is likely that a threshold point exists where the public 
will either refuse to hold larger and larger public debt portfolios, or the 
power to finance spending via inflation proves too onerous to economic or 
political stability. 
Our expectation is that funding levels act as opportunity sets and deter- 
mine the existing resource choices that governments choose to consume. 
Further, when the constraint is altered, the opportunity set is changed as 
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well. We expect apositive relation between opportunities and consumption; 
whenever the opportunity set is broadened, governments grow in size. 2 
3. Constraints on government behavior 
Differences ingross spending rowth between different units of government 
do not necessarily flow from dissimilar instinctive behaviors, but rather, 
more likely, from more technical factors affecting the funding constraints 
of governments. For example, there is no reason to expect different govern- 
ment units, or bureaucrats for that matter, to choose significantly different 
gross spending patterns when presented with identical funding constraints. 
However, we might expect diverse gross spending behaviors between go- 
vernment units when operating under dissimilar funding constraints. 3 This 
argument is similar in nature to the arguments in Brennan and Buchanan 
(1977, 1980) that suggest constitutional changes in constraints facing any 
form of Leviathan are necessary ingredients of any fundamental change in 
Leviathan's behavior. Accordingly, dissimilar behaviors may be the out- 
come of dissimilar funding constraints. 
3.1 Constraints at the Federal evel 
Major differences between observed public finances of the various units of 
government may stem from their relative abilities to pursue inflationary 
monetary policies. The power to inflate through money creation is only 
awarded to the Federal Reserve System, a creation of Congress as a quasi- 
Federal agency in 1913. As long as the Federal Reserve is willing, the Federal 
government can fund expenditures through inflation. Even though just 
another form of taxation, inflation represents a source of funding not readi- 
ly available to state and local governments. As such, the franchise of infla- 
tion is a potential reason for any observed ifferences in the public finances 
of Federal and state and local governments. 
The importance of indirect ax receipts in the total funding constraint was 
diminished in 1985 when the Federal tax system became indexed for infla- 
tion. However, to the extent hat the index system underestimates the real 
inflation rate, this revenue source plays a role, albeit a lesser role, in fi- 
nancing spending. Another factor is the existence of a Federal debt- 
limitation ceiling that has become binding in recent years. However, in all 
cases, the ceiling has been raised to allow adequate funding for incurred 
expenditures. 
An additional factor affecting the Federal budget constraint is related to 
the most recent concern over deficit spending. As discussed above, spending 
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is balanced by a combination of three revenue sources. Furthermore, the 
optimal mix of these funding sources is a function of their relative costs. As 
argued in Manage and Marlow (1986), these costs may be viewed as some 
function of the ability to gain votes and reelection. The recent outcry over 
deficit growth may be a product of a change in the relative cost of financing 
spending rowth through debt-issuance. Manage and Marlow (1986) sug- 
gest possible reasons for this change in relative cost. The rapid rise in debt- 
issuance may have exceeded the threshold level whereby citizens begin to 
perceive the growing claims on future resources, rising interest costs or 
future inflation implied by growing levels of spending and debt. Growing 
levels of debt may also make it more difficult to disguise the growth of 
government from the general populace. Whatever the case, Manage and 
Marlow (1986) argue that such changes could affect the character of the 
constraint facing expenditure choices by altering the relative costs of the 
various components of the total funding constraintl 
The most-recently legislated constraint is in the form of balanced budget 
legislation mandating a balanced budget by 1991, aka the Gramm-Rudman 
Amendment. By mandating successive years of progress toward a balanced 
budget, its passage may affect he tax revenue expenditure lation in the 
following ways. One, if it alters tax revenue it would alter spending when 
there is one-way causality running from receipts to expenditures or when 
two-way causality exists. Two, it may force a change in the character of the 
total funding constraint by making debt-issuance a relatively more costly 
means of financing expenditure; raising direct tax receipts and inflation or 
lowering expenditure growth would become relatively cheaper forms of 
lowering deficits. Given its recent passage (December 12, 1985), it is too ear- 
ly to know what real effect it will exert on future Federal finances. 4 
3.2 Constraints at the state and local level 
Unlike the Federal government, many states operate (over our sample pe- 
riod) under legislative or constitutional requirements that seek to constrain 
deficits. Like the Federal government, many state governments are con- 
strained, to varying degrees, by debt prohibitions or limitations. Given the 
complexity of the differences among all of the various state and local go- 
vernment units, this section only attempts to summarize and compare some 
of the more easily-recognizable issues facing funding constraints at the state 
level. 5 Extension to the local level is well beyond the scope of the paper. 
Only Connecticut and Vermont do not have constitutional or legislative 
limitations on operating deficits. For example, 25 states limit the amount 
or kinds of debt they may sell; 20 states do not allow appropriations to 
exceed estimated revenues; 18 states require Governors to submit balanced 
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budgets; 19 states require revenue short-falls to be met by reduced expendi- 
ture; and 4 states require current debt to be paid by tax increases in the fol- 
lowing year. There also exist limits on nonoperating budget debt (19 states); 
referendums to incur debt (4 states); and, dollar limits that can only be 
exceeded by referendums (5 states). 
On the surface, these requirements would appear to be driving forces 
toward balanced budgets or restrained spending. However, just as at the 
Federal level where extensions on debt limitation ceilings have reduced the 
effective constraint implied by ceilings on debt-issuance, the states appear 
to have developed rather sophisticated avenues around these constraints. 
The fact that state debt has risen faster than its federal counterpart over the 
past 20 years represents possible evidence that constitutional or legislative 
constraints on state government debt are weaker than previously thought. 6 
Furthermore, ven though more than three-fourths of state governments 
operate under constitutions that explicitly prohibit or constrain long-term 
indebtedness, every state has sold such debt. 
A large number of 'creative' financing procedures have been i vented by 
politicians and bureaucrats o circumvent constraints on state finances. 
States may earmark revenues to service the debt. Nonguaranteed debt has 
also proved to be a successful means of evading legislative or constitutional 
intent. In 1949, nonguaranteed debt comprised 15% of total ong-term state 
debt; such debt now comprises over 50% of the total and exceeds full faith 
and credit debt in 28 states. 7 
Circumvention through establishment of Off-Budget Enterprises has 
received growing attention. 8 Bennett and DiLorenzo (1983) present evi- 
dence on the rationale and development of public corporations and 'quasi'- 
governmental units that seek to circumvent legislative and constitutional 
constraints affecting state finance. The debt of these enterprises do not 
require voter approval and are not subject o debt restrictions. Further- 
more, financial data on their activities often do not appear in the official 
budgets of governments that created the 'quasi'-governmental unit. 
3.3 Implications for empirical work 
Government units are subject toheterogenous funding constraints. A com- 
plete list of the various limitations, prohibitions and requirements would 
prove both long and varied. However, a companion list displaying the 
ingenious methods that politicians and bureaucrats have invented to circum- 
vent the legislative and constitutional constraints would prove equally long 
and inventive. 
Implications for our empirical analysis follow. One, our analysis is not 
affected to the extent hat governments utilize creative financing methods 
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to fund on-budget spending. The choice to fund spending through debt, and 
not current ax revenue, only affects the current mix of the total funding 
level. That is, off-budget debt can be treated as 'legal' debt and does not 
change current tax revenues. Two, even though expefiditures may be under- 
reported in the case of off-budget spending, current tax revenue isnot used 
to finance unreported expenditure data. However, to the extent that future 
tax receipts or inflation fund this expenditure, the off-budget 'problem' 
may produce noise in the expenditure-receipt da a. Three, the existence of 
off-budget spending affects our perception of the relative proclivities of 
different government units toward deficits/surpluses. If, for example, state 
and local governments are 'hiding' significant portions of their expenditures 
through off-budget spending, then the size of their deficits/surpluses may 
be distorted. 
4. Granger causality 
We use Granger's definition of causality to analyze the r lation between 
expenditures and tax receipts. The definition of causality in Granger (1969) 
is based upon the predictability of a time series. If forecasts of a dependent 
variable Y using both lagged values of Y and lagged values of another 
variable X yield better forecasts han forecasts solely based on lagged values 
of Y, then X is said to cause Y. In other words, if 
0 .2 (Y IY ,  X) < 0 .2 (Y I Y) 
then X causes Y. The expression 02 (YI Y, X) represents he variance of the 
forecast error of Y obtained from the lagged values of both Y and X and 
the expression 02 (Y IV/) represents he variance of the forecast error Y 
based solely on lagged values of Y. According if 
o 2(XIX, Y) < 02(XIX) 
then Y causes X. 
Two-way causality occurs when simultaneity exists between Y and X. 
Causation runs from X to Y and from Y to X. Other terms used to describe 
this form of interdependence include bidirectional causality and feedback. 
Two-way causality occurs when 
cr 2 (YI Y, X) < 02 (YI V() 
and 
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It should be noted that Granger's (1969) definition of causality assumes 
that information relevant to predicting Y and X is contained only in these 
same variables. Spurious causality may result when an unspecified third 
variable enters the model which causes both Y and X. 
Further detail on causality tests may be found in Box and Jenkins (1970), 
Granger (1969), and Nelson and Schwert (1982). For a detailed critique of
various problems associated with causality tests see Conway, Swamy, Yana- 
gida and Von Zur Muehlin (1984). 
We estimate the equations 
n in 
X t c~j X t_ j + ~j Yt- j  + Ut (1) 
j=l  j=l  
n m 
Yt 3'3 Xt- j  + ~j Yt- j  + Vt (2) 
j=l  j=l  
where U and V are uncorrelated and 
E [Ut, Us] O, E [Vt, Vs] O, E [Ut, Vs] 0 for all t s. 
Unidirectional, or one-way, causation from X to Y is implied when the 
set of estimated coefficients on the lagged X variables in (2) is statistically 
different from zero as a group and when the set of estimated coefficients 
on the Y variables in (1) is not statistically different from zero. 
Unidirectional causation from Y to X is implied when the set of estimated 
coefficients on the lagged Y variables in (1) is statistically different from 
zero as a group and the set of estimated coefficients on the lagged X vari- 
ables in (2) is not statistically different from zero as a group. 
Bidirectional causation between X and Y is implied when the set of esti- 
mated coefficients on lagged Y variables in (1) is statistically significant as 
a group and the set of estimated coefficients on the lagged X variables in 
(2) is also statistically significant as a group. 
5. Empirical results 
We apply the Granger causality test to annual observations on nominal state 
and local expenditures E and nominal tax revenues R over the period 
1952-82. Separate xpenditure and revenue series are available for state 
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Table 1. Granger's test of causality between expenditures and tax receipts 
State level 
E on R R on E 
Degrees of 
Lag Form F-ratio a freedom F-ratio b 
(2,2) 11.031 ** 2,24 5.074* 
(3,3) 11.733** 3,21 1.847 
(4,4) 8.397** 4,18 1.598 








E on R R on E 
Degrees of 
Lag form F-ratio freedom F-ratio 
(2,2) 5.122" 2,24 2.805 
(3,3) 1.310 3,21 1.418 
(4,4) 1.219 4,18 1.441 







* Denotes ignificance at 50/0 level. 
** Denotes ignificance at 1% level. 
a Refers to F-test for joint significance of lagged R variables. 
b Refers to F-test for joint significance of lagged E variables. 
and local governments. All data are obtained from Tax Foundation, Inc. 
(1983) and the choice of time period is solely dictated by data availability 
at time of examination. Checks on the residuals of the estimated equations 
do not indicate significant serial correlation. As reported in Manage and 
Marlow (1986), symmetric lag structures ranging from two-to-five years are 
considered here. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the Granger tests on state and local 
data. (See Appendices A and B detailed regression results). For the equa- 
tions with expenditures E as the dependent variable, the null hypothesis i
tested that the lagged values of tax receipts R do not improve the forecasts 
of expenditures E over the one obtained on the basis of the lagged values 
of expenditures E alone. For equations with tax receipts R as the dependent 
variable, the null hypothesis i that the lagged values of expenditures E do 
not improve the forecast of tax receipts R over the one obtained on the basis 
of the lagged values of tax receipts R alone. 
First, we discuss tests on the state data. The Granger test indicates uni- 
le . nger's st usality twe n xpenditures d x ceipts 
ate vel 
gre s gre s 
  tio' edom tiob edom 
,2) .031  ,24 .074* ,29 
,3) .73 ** ,21 .847 ,21 
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 r  tio edom tio edom 
,2) .12 * ,24 .805 , 4 
,3) .310 ,21 .418 ,21 
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directional causality that runs from tax receipts R to expenditures E for all 
lag structures except he shortest (2,2). These results imply that the hypo- 
thesis that tax receipts R do cause expenditures E cannot be rejected at the 
five percent level of significance. For the shortest lag length (2,2), the 
Granger test indicates bidirectional causality, or feedback, between state 
expenditures and tax receipts. Bidirectional causality suggests imultaneity 
between expenditures E and tax receipts R so that one can not reject the 
hypothesis that higher spending levels result from higher tax revenue levels. 
That is, tax revenue and expenditure decisions are simultaneously deter- 
mined in the shortest lag length (2,2). 
Second, we discuss tests on the local government data. The Granger test 
indicates unidirectional causality that runs from tax receipts R to expendi- 
tures E, for the shortest lag length (2,2). However, for the remaining lag 
lengths, no causality is indicated. That is, expenditures E and tax revenues 
R appear to be independent of one another at the local level of government. 
Consequently, the results of tests with symmetric lag structures ranging 
from three-to-five years at the local level of government indicate that in- 
creases or decreases in tax revenue will exert no influence on expenditures 
(and vice versa). 
6. Concluding remarks 
The results of our tests indicate similarities between the expenditure-tax 
receipt relations of state governments o those previously reported for the 
Federal government inManage and Marlow (1986); the results reported here 
indicate support for the hypothesis that tax receipts cause expenditures at
the state level of government. For tests utilizing symmetric lag structures 
ranging from three to five years, state expenditures appear to follow state 
tax receipts. For the shortest lag length (2,2), the determination of bidirec- 
tional causality does not make us reject he hypothesis that higher spending 
levels result from higher revenue levels; rather, the causality appears to be 
in both directions for the shortest lag length. 
The finding that tax revenues and expenditures are not causally related 
at the local level for the three longest lag structures i unexpected. However, 
the result may be a product of an aggregation problem. The fact that all 
local governments are aggregated on a state-by-state basis may generate 
observations that are not useful for our empirical work. For example, if the 
funding constraints of local governments on a state-by-state basis are espe- 
cially diverse, their aggregation to the state level of observation may pro- 
duce data that is not economically meaningful. 9 Nonetheless, the one case 
where significant causality is observed lends some empirical support for the 
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hypothesis that tax receipts determine spending. 
Two policy implications are mentioned. One, policy proposals at all evels 
of governments aimed at solving the occurence of unacceptably large defi- 
cits should consider the linkage between expenditures and tax receipts 
before they recommend discretionary changes in either or both of the com- 
ponents of deficits: expenditures and tax receipts. For example, the results 
of our tests do not rule out the not ion that a tax increase could promote 
expenditures that ultimately counter the deficit-reducing effect of a given 
tax hike. 
Two, the fact that our results at the state level lend support for the view 
that causality runs one-way from expenditures to tax receipts uggests that 
the many dissimilarities in legislative and constitutional constraints between 
the Federal and state levels of government may not matter much in terms 
of the causal relation between expenditures and tax revenues. A possible 
reason for similarities in behavior may stem from the circumvention of 
legislative or constitutional intent at the state level of government which 
ult imately serve to weaken differences between the effective constraints 
facing Federal and state governments. Moreover, it would be puzzling if we 
found widely disparate behaviors between government units in the absence 
of significantly different constraints. 
NOTES 
1. Much of this discussion appears in Manage and Marlow (1986). 
2. While we expect positive causality from tax revenues to spending, causality tests do not 
constrain the direction in any way. That is, causality tests h lp us to imply direction. 
3. Of course, different government units can be expected to allocate gross resources in diffe- 
rent fashions a related to subjective preferences. 
4. Possibly the most interesting question will be whether or not balanced budget legislation will 
affect the growth of government (e.g. see Marlow, 1986). Without a spending constraint 
on government behavior, the books of g vernment units could be balanced with high or low 
expenditure-to-national income ratios. That is, a balanced budget will not necessarily solve 
problems or trends, associated with a growing government sector it may only disguise 
some of its symptoms. 
5. This section borrows liberally from Congressional Budget Office (1983). 
6. See Congressional Budget Office (1983). 
7. See Congressional Budget Office (1983). 
8. The phenomena of off-budget expenditure has increasingly been utilized by the Federal 
government asa means of funding expenditure. 
9. For example, Manage and Marlow (1985) finds positive unidirectional causality from 
expenditures to receipts for causality tests on aggregated state andlocal data. That is, the 
unit of observation was state and local government units aggregated to the state level. How- 
ever, it is difficult o know what that data represents i  erms of providing information on 
how individual government units behave in t eir finances. Consequently, the present paper 
reflects a disaggregation in the data nd, accordingly, a better sample from which to imply 
causality in the revenue-spending relations of state and local governments. 
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Appendix A. Regression results: State receipt - State spending relation* 
Y X C\<] az 0'3 0'4 as {3] {3z {33 {34 {3s Constant RZ 
E R .803 - .034 .826 - .202 .220 .99 
(4.22) (2.24) (3.50) (.87) (2.26) 
R E .651 -.OOJ .141 .293 - .197 .99 
(3.03) ~ (.30) (.81) (1.69) (2.22) 
.1l9 - .528 .9J5 .438 - .501E R .535 .397 .99 
(2.76) (.49) (2.71) (4.17) (1.44) (2.37) (3.66) 
R E .723 -.001 .006 .654 .376 - .162 -.139 .99 
(3.04) (.14) (.26) (.31) (1.44) ~ (.77) (1.18) 
E R .398 .134 - .342 - .206 .930 .559 - .219 - .284 .492 .99 
(1.66) (.52) (1.30) (.86) (3.90) (1.50) (.65) (1.13) (3.25) 
R E .625 .309 .303 -.001 -.133 .307 .007 -.400 .001 .99 
(2.63) (.83) (.90) (.31) (.55) (1.20) (.29) (1.68) (.31) 
E R .381 .126 -.292 - .165 - .167 .858 .542 - .001 - .408 .163 .478 .99 
(1.49) (.438) (1.05) (.57) (.6J) (2.94) (1.35) (.15) (1.12) (.58) (2.36) 
R E .684 .356 .499 .120 - .324 - .209 .180 .148 - .227 - .232 .174 .99 
(2.45) (.92) (1.24) (.34) (1.21) (.85) (.65) (.55) (.82) (.88) (.90) 
I-statistics in parentheses. 
E = nominal state expenditures. 
R = nominal state revenues. n n 


















































































Appendix B. Regression results: Local receipts Local spending relation* -I 


























E R 1.187 -.517 .293 .99 
(6.37) (2.09) (1.95) 
R E 1.11 - .258 .001 .99- -. 
(5.56) (1.30) (.45) 
. 






. (4.38) (1.53) (.399) (1.01) 
R E 1.22 - .463 .324 .147 .159 




E R 1.18 - .439 .243 2.13 - .439 .217 
(3.96) (1.07) (.66) (.59) (1.03) (.294) 
. 
I
- .281 .173 
(1.15) 
R E 1.01 - .105 .150 .267 .263 -.146 -.001 
~
 
~ (.59) (.469) 
.375 .389 .99-I ~ '
~
 
(3.41) (.20) (.34) (.81) (1.26) l(.509) (1.49) 
.122 - .563 .298 1.00 - .716 
. (.35) (1.50) 
.383 .359E R -.193 
(3.71) (1.06) (.26) (.45) (.30) (1.13) 










(1.25) (.91) (.68) ( 68) 
(3.47) (.11) (.00) (.56) (.60) (1.31) (.00) (1.50) (.72) 
~
t-statistics in parentheses. 
E = local expenditures. 
R = local receipts. 
* Estimating equation is : Y t = 
n 
E !Xj Y t - j + 
n 
E [3j Xt _ j + e(" 
.99 
.99 
.99 
